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I. INTRODUCTIONS O COMPLEX ARE THE QUESTIONS of what the right of privacy is, and
when and how it can be invoked, that special precautions must be taken
to prevent an article dealing with it from drifting off into the fascinating
but misty realms of metaphysical speculation. This Article will deal with
an important issue raised but not answered by the Federal Freedom of
Information and Privacy Acts: the rights of a private party who seeks
to prevent the federal government from releasing information concern-
ing him.
In a very limited context, the United States Supreme Court has already
addressed this issue. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,' discussed at length
below, it was held that a commercial entity (Chrysler) possessed a right
of action when the federal government proposed to release information,
supplied to it by the entity, in response to requests under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA).2 The nature of the Court's holding in Chrysler
* Attorney, New York City Transit Authority. B.A., State University of New
York; J.D., University of Chicago Law School. The author wishes to thank the
University of Miami Law School for a grant which aided in the completion of
this Article.
441 U.S. 281 (1979).
5 U.S.C. S 552 (1976).
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left in doubt whether there are constitutional dimensions to the right
asserted by one seeking to enjoin the government from releasing
information-the so-called "reverse FOIA" litigant. The privacy aspects
of the first and fourth amendments to the Constitution will be examined
here as potential sources for a right of action for the non-commercial
reverse FOIA litigant.
II. THESIS
The Freedom of Information Act reflects a strong policy of effectuating
the sovereignty of the people by affording public access to information
needed to monitor the activities of the federal government accurately.
The possibility of such monitoring is a vital element of a democratic
society.' The FOIA, however, goes beyond ensuring access to informa-
tion needed to monitor government; it affords access to most government-
possessed information to virtually anyone, without regard to the purpose
for which the information is sought.
There are sound reasons for this. It is hard to predict what informa-
tion given to which requester will contribute to the monitoring process.
Barriers to obtaining information created by earlier "access" provisions
have historically shown an alarming tendency to swell and become well-
nigh impenetrable.' Common sense demands that the government being
monitored have as little power as practical to block, divert or confuse
the monitoring process.
' "The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to
the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and
to hold the governors accountable to the governed." NLRB v. Robbins Tire and
Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 243 (1978). See also GTE Sylvania v. Consumers Union,
445 U.S. 375, 385 (1980); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 153 (1975).
' The Freedom of Information Act was a revision of section 3, the "public
information" section, of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
S 1002 (1964 ed.). The prior law had failed to provide the desired access
to information relied upon in government decision making, and in fact
had become "the major statutory excuse for withholding government
records from public view." H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 3
(1966) . . . See also id. at 4, 12; S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
3, 5 (1965) ... EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973). Section 3 had several
vague phrases upon which officials could rely to refuse requests for
disclosure: "in the public interest," "relating solely to the internal manage-
ment of an agency," "for good cause." Even material on the public record
was available only to "persons properly and directly concerned." These
undefined phrases placed broad discretion in the hands of agency officials
in deciding what information to disclose, and that discretion was often
abused.
GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1980).
"[Tihe 1946 Administrative Procedure Act ... stated that all public records
were open for inspection unless for good cause they were held to be confidential.
All secrecy-minded bureaucrats could, of course, find good cause, in the public
interest, to withhold records." Archibald, The Freedom of Information Act Revisited,
39 PUB. AD. REV. 311. 314 (1979).
[Vol. 31:455
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Still, there are serious dangers which arise from almost unlimited in-
formational access. One of these is the threat that the privacy of individ-
uals will be subject to gross invasion. The federal government possesses
vast stores of information which either directly or indirectly reflect private
facts about individuals.5 The Privacy Act of 1974, passed to protect in-
dividual privacy, is a shield of limited utility in the context of an FOIA
request.' In the typical suit under FOIA, a requester seeks to force an
unwilling government to divulge information. The so-called "reverse
FOIA" suit is a situation in which the subject of the information seeks
to force a willing government not to divulge. The reverse FOIA suit is
thus a forum in which the policies favoring information release by the
government must be balanced against claims that the information at issue
should not be released.
This Article contends that the counter balance to the FOIA's policy
of almost unlimited access is to be found in either the first or fourth amend-
ment. Both of these amendments rest upon a fundamental recognition
of the right of individuals to make self-governing choices, and it is the
exercise of this right that is inhibited by the indiscriminate release of
information. Of the two, the procedurally-oriented fourth amendment, with
its emphasis upon the reasonableness of governmental action, is the more
potent source for the rights claimed by the reverse FOIA litigant.
This Article deals with these matters in the purposely limited context
of the standing possessed by a non-commercial reverse FOIA litigant. The
question of who possesses a right of action has often been critical in
reverse FOIA cases. 7 An attempt to answer it with regard to the non-
commercial litigant, as opposed to the typical commercial litigant who
has an interesting technical statutory right of action pursuant to Chrysler,
highlights the constitutional issues involved.
A. The Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act provides an extraordinarily broad right
for requesters to obtain information possessed by the federal government.
In essence, anyone may request any information from the government
and the government, if it possesses the information, must release it. The
only significant exceptions to mandatory release provided by the FOIA
' As of the end of 1978, Executive Branch agencies of the federal govern-
ment maintained 5,881 systems of records on individuals which contained more
than 3,652,600,000 records on individuals. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
FEDERAL PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974,
FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET REPORT].
6 5 U.S.C. S 552(a) (1976).
See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Union Oil of Cal. v. FPC,
542 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F.
Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1974), affd, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 924 (1977).
1982]
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concern information described in one of nine narrow exemptions.'
The FOIA has "disclosure, not secrecy" as its "dominant objective."9
In the landmark Chrysler Corp. v. Brown decision, the Supreme Court
determined "[t]hat the FOIA is exclusively a disclosure statute."'0 In line
with this, the nine statutory exemptions to disclosure under the FOIA
8 5 U.S.C. S 552(b). This section does not apply to matters that are:
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Execu-
tive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive
order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than sec-
tion 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the
matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no
discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding
or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation
with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforce-
ment proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) dis-
close the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled
by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation,
or by any agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation,
confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose
investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety
of law enforcement personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regula-
tion or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concern-
ing wells.
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under
this subsection.
I Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). The Senate report
accompanying the original (1966) Freedom of Information Act states that it reflects
"a general philosophy of full agency disclosure." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3, 8 (1965). In 1978, there were 719,496 requests for access to government
records granted in whole or in part, as compared with 1,385 requests for access
which were denied. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET REPORT, supra note
5, at 15.
441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979).
[VCol. 31:455
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are to be narrowly construed" and doubts as to whether material must
be disclosed under the Act are to be resolved in favor of disclosure. 2
It is generally agreed that the purpose behind the FOIA was to
eliminate, to a far greater degree than ever before, the threat of "secret
government."'"
For the great majority of different records, the public as a whole
has a right to know what its Government is doing. There is, of
course, a certain need for confidentiality in some aspects of
Government operations and these are protected specifically [by
the nine exemptions to FOIA]; but outside these limited areas,
all citizens have a right to know. 4
The FOIA provides:
Except with respect to the records made available under
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon any
request for records, which (A) reasonably describes such records
and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the
time, place, fees (if any) and procedures to be followed, shall make
the records promptly available to any person."5
In carrying out this provision, the courts have seldom required any
showing of need, or even of legitimate interest, in the requested materials
by the requesting party. "FOIA ... does not distinguish between litigants
on the basis of their need for information."'" One seeking information from
" Rose, 425 U.S. at 361; Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945,
949-50 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
12 Rose, 425 U.S. at 366; Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
13 Rose, 425 U.S. at 361; EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
'1 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1965). "The attention of Congress
was primarily focused on the efforts of officials to prevent release of information
in order to hide mistakes or irregularities committed by the agency." GTE Sylvania
v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375, 385 (1980).
"s 5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(3) (1976) (emphasis added).
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of S 552(a) refer to materials which agencies must publish
in the Federal Register or which must be either automatically made available
for public inspection and copying or published and offered for sale.
"The thrust of the laws Congress has enacted is that governmental records
belong to the American people and should be accessible to them- barring security
and privacy considerations -for legitimate historical and other research purposes."
American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 485 F. Supp. 222, 235 (D.D.C. 1980).
" Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 18, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1978). "The Freedom
of Information Act may be invoked by any member of 'the public'- without a
showing of need-to compel disclosure of confidential Government documents."
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 92 (1971). See also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975); Cooper v. Department of Navy, 558 F.2d 274 (5th
Cir. 1977); Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591 (D.C. Del. 1972), affd, 479 F.2d 317
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1024 (1973).
1982]
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1982
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
a federal agency need not even reveal his identity to that agency. 7
The Supreme Court has determined that the nine exemptions to the
FOIA policy of mandatory disclosure are discretionary. 8 That is, if informa-
tion falling within one of the narrowly-construed exemptions set forth
in section 552(b) is the subject of a request under the FOIA, the appro-
priate administrator or agency has discretion to release the exempted
information. It has further been determined that courts are without equity
power to enjoin the release of information falling outside the FOIA
exemptions. 9 The FOIA itself provides no right of action for the reverse
FOIA litigant.
B. The Privacy Act
The Privacy Act of 1974 provides that:
No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system
of records by any means of communication to any person or to
another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with
the prior written consent of the individual to whom the record
pertains, unless the disclosure would be [within one of eleven
exemptions]."
The second exemption applies when the record is "required under sec-
tion 552 of [FOIA].1 2 As defined by the Privacy Act, an "individual" is
a citizen or permanent alien resident of the United States,' and a "record"
VT Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Wash. 1968), affd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th
Cir. 1969).
" Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292-94 (1979); see also GTE Sylvania
v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375, 378 (1980).
19 Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Tennessean Newspapers,
Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 661-62 (6th Cir. 1972); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,
678 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Contra Consumers Union v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp.
796, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
There are indications in some of the cases in which the courts have found
themselves without equitable power to enjoin the disclosure of non-exempt material
that "exceptional circumstances," similar to those which would justify prior
restraint under the first amendment, might permit a court to enjoin the release
of material not within any of the FOIA exemptions. Rose v. Department of Air
Force, 495 F.2d 261, 269 (2d Cir. 1974), affid, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Halperin v. Depart-
ment of State, 565 F.2d 699, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
2' 5 U.S.C. S 552a(b) (1976).
21 Id. at S 552a(b)(2). It should also be noted that, unlike most other disclosures,
disclosures made pursuant to the FOIA are not required to have an accurate
agency accounting made of them. Id. at S 552a(c)(1).
"The provision which exempts disclosures under the FOIA from the account-
ing requirement is one of the bridges between the two statutes. Consent for such
disclosures need not be obtained and the agency need not review the record before
disseminating it pursuant to a FOIA request." Note, The Privacy Act of 1974:
An Overview, 1976 DUKE L.J. 301, 312.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2).
[Vol. 31:455
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is "any item, collection or grouping of material about an individual that
is maintained by an agency ... that contains his name, or the identifying
number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual,
such as a finger or voice print or photograph." 3 A "system of records"
is "a group of any records under the control of any agency from which
information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identi-
fying number, symbol, or other identifying particulars assigned to the
individual."" Thus, only information retrievable by the name or other iden-
tifying particulars of an individual is covered by the provisions of the
Privacy Act which forbid release without prior consent. Information about
an individual contained in a record not so retrievable is outside the Privacy
Act's coverage despite the potential for the invasion of an individual's
privacy.
III. THE CASE OF PROFESSOR DOE
The potential threat to an individual's privacy posed by information
contained in records outside the Privacy Act's coverage and subject to
FOIA requests may be usefully illustrated through the hypothetical situa-
tion set out below. While hypothetical the circumstances outlined are by
no means improbable.
Professor John Doe, of the University of Xanth, discovers that the
Department of Education, in response to an FOIA request from a pro-
fessor of education at another university, is going to release materials
it gathered while doing a study of Xanth to discover how that university
has used its government grant money. Doe is alarmed because he recalls
having been indiscreetly candid in talking to government investigators
about the doings of his colleagues and superiors, and because he fears
they may have been equally candidabout him. He thinks that even if
the Department should delete names before releasing the file - a procedure
it is by no means certain to follow 2 -anyone with a casual knowledge
23 Id. at 552a(a)(4).
24 Id. at 552a(a)(5).
25 "[Ijnformation pertaining to the requester ... need not be disclosed unless
the information is retrievable by means of the requester's own name or other
personal identifier. That it can be easily retrieved in some other way by some
other identifier is wholly beside the point." Smiertka v. Department of Treasury,
447 F. Supp. 221, 228 (D.D.C. 1978).
See Sonderegger v. Department of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 847 (D. Idaho 1976),
in which a victim of a dam disaster sought to enjoin the release of the names
of the compensated disaster victims, the amount they had claimed, the amount
they actually collected and the category in which they collected.
In a 1979 article, the Freedom of Information officer for the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare stressed the "broadest access" policy of that
Department. He noted that "HEW's procedure has consistently been to inter-
pret and implement the [Freedom of Information] Act's provisions for access to
information in the broadest and most open fashion, i.e., never to deny a request
for records unless the records are legally exempt from disclosure and there is
19821
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of Xanth will be quite capable of reconstructing who said what about
whom. 7
At this point, a working definition of "privacy" must be adopted to
give substance to further discussions. At least in a rough sense, it must
be made clear what is being "invaded" or "lost" when privacy is intruded
upon. Following David M. O'Brien's analysis, privacy-an existential
condition-must be distinguished from the concept of a right of privacy:
an entitlement to maintain or achieve the condition." Although it con-
fuses the right to privacy with privacy itself, Professor Alan Westin's
definition is useful: "the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others."' Privacy, then, can be equated with
control of information about oneself. Thus, it is a relative condition.
In theory, either total privacy (e.g., I am the only possessor of the fact
that I wrongfully pulled a fire alarm in 1965) or virtually no privacy at
all (e.g., I was caught in the act when I turned in that false alarm and
every newspaper in the world has reported that fact, reprinting the story
annually) are possible with regard to any given fact. In addition, privacy
a compelling need to withhold them .... Roberts, Faithful Execution of the FOIA
Act: One Executive Branch Experience, 39 PUB. AD. REV. 318, 319 (1979) (emphasis
added).
It is common sense that an agency will generally not go over a record carefully
and delete identifying particulars which may cause an invasion of privacy unless
that agency is either unusually scrupulous and well-funded or the agency's own
institutional needs call for such a process.
The Supreme Court, in Rose, 425 U.S. 352, noted that "[t]o be sure, redac-
tion cannot eliminate all risk of identifiability, as any human approximation risks
some degree of imperfection, and the consequences of exposure of identity [of
Air Force cadets who had been the subject of disciplinary proceedings] can ad-
mittedly be severe." Id. at 381. The Court felt, however, that deletions would
be sufficient for exemption 6 purposes if, while there were "incidental" invasions
of privacy, there were no "such disclosures as would constitute 'clearly unwar-
ranted' invasions of personal privacy." Id. at 382. Chief Justice Burger was strongly
critical of the majority in his dissenting opinion, both because of the danger to
individual privacy he saw in the majority's approach and because he viewed it
as placing an "intolerable burden" on the district courts. Id. at 383-85.
See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150, 161 (D.D.C. 1976);
Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Department of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 747 (9th Cir.
1979).
Courts which attempt to excise identifying material will necessarily be
hampered by the fact that they will not be privy to the information which an
outside party attempting reconstruction may have. For example, in our
hypothetical situation, a colleague of Professor Doe may know that the chairman
of Doe's department is the only member of the faculty to have had his home
redone in the past few years. The fact that "[Blank] may have improperly used
a government grant to redecorate [his/her] home" tells the colleague something
about the chairman, despite the deletion of the more obvious identifiers.
28 D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 15-17 (1979).
2 A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1970).
[Vol. 31:455
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can exist to almost any degree between the two extremes, as the individual
loses more and more control over the personal information (e.g., my wife
and I know I turned in a false alarm; my wife, Father Flannagan and
I know; my wife, Father Flannagan, the C.I.A. and I know . . .). So long
as some control over the datum is retained, some privacy is likewise re-
tained. A fact revealed to another is not the same as a total voluntary
loss of privacy, since there may be a reasonable expectation that the
revealed fact will either not be given further publicity or will only be
given limited publicity. In addition, sanctions may be imposed if private
facts are revealed by a confidant. The privacy being "invaded" when a
given fact about an individual becomes more widely known than he desires,
is the sum total of his control over all facts concerning him. When a quan-
tum of that control is lost, privacy is lost; when a quantum of that control
is wrenched from someone, privacy is invaded.
The mere possession of privacy does not presuppose a right to it. A
would-be assassin may possess privacy, i.e., control over the dissemina-
tion of the fact that he plans to shoot the President. The invasion of his
privacy is applauded if occasioned by a lawful investigation which discloses
the private fact and prevents the crime. In contrast, the loss of privacy
does not presuppose a loss of the right to privacy; a suit can vindicate
an invaded right when an illegal invasion has taken place, applying the
poultice of money to the wound.
The sources of rights to privacy are varied. Among them seem to be
both the common law and the common law as pictured by Louis D.
Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren writing in the Harvard Law Review."
This Article, however, will look to those rights of privacy that can fairly
be said to have their origins in either the first or fourth amendment of
the Constitution and are arguably relevant to the reverse FOIA litigant's
situation.
Returning to the hypothetical Professor Doe, while it is too early to
determine whether his rights to privacy are threatened, certainly his
privacy interests are in peril. Information over which he has some control
is at stake, since presumably only he and the government know what
he told the investigators. One fact which will be revealell if the requested
information is released, one over which Doe never had sole control, is
the fact that he spoke to the government. Other facts were under his
complete control at one time: his opinions of his colleagues. Still others
were under his partial control: facts known to him and his colleagues,
before the government collected the information, concerning the use of
research grants. In a rough way, an individual's control of information
lessens as the number of persons who share the datum in question in-
creases and lessens in proportion to the probability that a sharer of the
datum will communicate it beyond the circle of those who already have
the information. The information obtained from Doe is in a file retrievable
30 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
19821
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by means of the title "Xanth University Use of Government Funds," which
is part of a collection of files retrievable by means of the names of
American universities.
Doe is concerned that: 1) his privacy will be invaded-that he will lose
whatever remaining control he has over information contained in the re-
quested file-and he will thus suffer an affront to his dignity;31 2) he will
suffer embarrassment both because information about him in the file will
become public knowledge and because his colleagues will know he told
the government unfavorable things about them, and his relations with
them will consequently suffer; 3) his chances for tenure or promotion will
be worsened if the information becomes public knowledge.
Doe is particularly worried about the revelation of two facts: 1) he told
the government, truthfully, that the chairman of his department had used
two-thirds of a government grant to redecorate his home; 2) he had told
his colleagues that he spent one summer doing research pursuant to a
government grant. In reality, he was in a camp run by a religious cult
which is held in low repute by the general public.
Doe's first realization is that the Privacy Act of 197432 does not require
the Department of Education to obtain his or, indeed, anyone else's con-
sent before releasing the requested information. Since the Xanth Univer-
sity file postulated above is not retrievable by Doe's name, or another
identifying particular assigned to him, the Privacy Act does not afford
him the right to be informed of the proposed release of a file containing
information about him. Nor does the Privacy Act require that Xanth
University give its consent; the Act applies only to individuals, i.e., citizens
of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence.'
Such legal "persons" as corporations are not covered by the Act. 4
The reverse FOIA suit has developed as a potential remedy for those
who, like Doe, find themselves threatened by a proposed release of inform-
ation pursuant to an FOIA request. Reverse FOIA suits seeking an in-
junction have generally been brought by commercial entities who, having
submitted arguably commercially valuable information to the federal
government, are distressed when the government proposes to release that
information. 5 The question of the standing of a commercial entity to bring
such a suit was dealt with by the Supreme Court in Chrysler Corp. v.
, "For privacy is the necessary context for relationships which we would
hardly be human if we had to do without-the relationships of love, friendship,
and trust." Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 484 (1968).
32 5 U.S.C. S 552a (1976).
Id. at §§ 552a(f)(1), 552a(a)(2), 552a(a)(5).
3 Dresser Indus. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1979).
Typical cases include: GTE Sylvania v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375 (1980);
St. Mary's Hospital v. Harris, 604 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1979); Planning Research
Corp. v. FPC, 555 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 31:455
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Brown,' a decision with important implications for all future reverse FOIA
cases.
IV. STANDING OF THE COMMERCIAL REVERSE FOIA LITIGANT:
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown presented the Supreme Court with a situation
typical of most reverse FOIA cases which have been decided: A commer-
cial entity which had submitted information to the government sought
to prevent the release of that information to another entity or entities
that might use it in a manner inimical to the interests of the submitter.
So typical is this situation that at least one legal scholar apparently con-
siders it the only situation meriting the rubric, "reverse FOIA litigation."3
Chrysler sought to enjoin the release of information concerning its
employment practices furnished to the Defense Logistics Agency in com-
pliance with affirmative action programs.
Chrysler made three arguments in support of its prayer for an
injunction: that disclosure was barred by the FOIA; that it was
inconsistent with 18 U.S.C. Subsection 1905, 42 U.S.C. Section
2000e-8(e), and 44 U.S.C. Section 3508... and finally that disclosure
was an abuse of agency discretion insofar as it conflicted with
OFCCP [Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs] rules. 8
The threshold question, however, was whether Chrysler had a right of
action at all.
The Court held that the FOIA, as an exclusively disclosure-oriented
statute, never forbade the release of information by the government.
Under this interpretation the nine exemptions to the mandatory disclosure
provisions of the FOIA create categories of information which are unaf-
fected by the statute. FOIA leaves it within the appropriate government
official's discretion whether or not to invoke one of the exemptions and
refuse to release requested information.
In Justice Rehnquist's rather complex decision, it was held that plain-
tiff Chrysler had standing to bring its non-disclosure suit under section
10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as a "person . . . ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
36 441 U.S. 281 (1979). Useful articles in this area include: Braverman, Chrysler
Corporation v. Brown-Protecting Business Secrets in the 80's, 4 CORP. L. REV.
23 (1981); Campbell, Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation: The Need for
Congressional Action, 67 Geo. L.J. 103 (1978); Drachsler, FOIA and the "Right"
of Non-disclosure, 28 AD. L. REV. 1 (1976); Note, The Reverse-FOIA Lawsuit:
Routes to Nondisclosure After Chrysler: A New Direction, 48 FORDHAM L. REV.
185 (1979); Note, Protection From Governmental Disclosure-The Reverse FOIA
Suit, 1976 DUKE L.J. 330.
17 Campbell, Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation: The Need for Con-
gressional Action, 67 GEO. L.J. 103 (1978).
38 441 U.S. at 288.
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relevant statute."' The relevant statute in question was the Trade Secrets
Act,4" a criminal statute under which Chrysler had no independent cause
of action. Section 10(a) of the APA does not in and of itself provide a
right of action4' but does require that a person be "suffering legal wrong
because of agency action or [be] adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 2 Section 10(a) gave
Chrysler standing because of the possibility that the government, in pro-
posing to release Chrysler's affirmative action compliance materials, would
violate the Trade Secrets Act. This resulted from the Court's determina-
tion that the nine FOIA exemptions set a boundary to that Act's scope
and, therefore, releasing information covered by an exemption was "not
authorized by law" (a requirement for the release of trade secrets), at
least under the provisions of the FOIA.43
It is unclear whether the fact that Chrysler itself had submitted the
information covered by the FOIA request had any significance to the
Court. Arguably, it should have been irrelevant. Chrysler would be
damaged equally if information on its employment practices had been
received by the government from a third party, rather than from Chrysler,
and then revealed to Chrysler's rivals; the Trade Secrets Act is violated
merely by the revelation of a trade secret regardless of its source.44
" 5 U.S.C. 5 702 (1976).
40 18 U.S.C. 5 1905 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any
department or agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes
known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any informa-
tion coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties
or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return,
report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or
officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the
trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work or apparatus, or to
the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any in-
come, profits, losses or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership,
corporation, or association, or permits any income return or copy thereof
or any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be seen
or examined by any other person except as provided by law; shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both; and shall be removed from office or employment.
41 Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 599 (1977).
42 5 U.S.C. S 702 (1976).
11 441 U.S. at 285. "Since materials that are exempt from disclosure under
the FOIA are by virtue of Part II of this opinion outside the ambit of that Act,
the Government cannot rely on the FOIA as congressional authorization for
disclosure regulations that permit the release of information within the Act's
nine exemptions." Id. at 303-04.
44 It could, of course, be argued that if the' information had been in the posses-
sion of the government due to active government investigation, its release would
be more likely to serve the primary goal of the FOIA: prevention of secret govern-
ment. The public, it would be contended, can only evaluate the worth of govern-
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The private individual who is not a commercial entity cannot rely upon
the Chrysler combination of section 10(a) of the APA and the Trade Secrets
Act to give him standing; his secrets are not trade secrets. However,
the Chrysler "10(a) plus" equation remains significant for the non-
commercial reverse FOIA litigant. Provisions of the Constitution might
perform the same service for a non-commercial litigant that the Trade
Secrets Act performed for the commercial litigant in Chrysler. The
Supreme Court has determined that the reverse FOIA litigant, in his pur-
suit of a right of action, may follow the procedural path set out by APA
section 10(a). The problem of which constitutional equipment is more
suitable on that path remains open.
Chrysler and Department ofAir Force v. Rose have confined the courts'
equity power so that they may not enjoin the release of information fall-
ing outside the nine FOIA exemptions. 5 Seemingly, to have a right of
action, Doe will have to show that the Xanth material is within one of
those FOIA exemptions." By demonstrating that the release of the
material is within the discretion of the federal agency involved, Doe should
be able to prove that releasing the information would be an abuse of that
discretion. The "10(a) plus" formula used by the Chrysler Court should
be followed to show that Doe is a "person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute" and is "entitled to judicial
review."4
Thus, it must first be determined whether the information postulated
above is arguably within the coverage of an FOIA exemption. The most
plausible exemption for Doe is exemption 6, "clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy."'48 Only if the information is arguably within an ex-
emption, can the second question of whether or not the Constitution pro-
vides a privacy "right" which can appropriately be inserted in the Chrysler
formula be addressed.
Arguably, the crucial issue of notice is being overlooked in the Doe
example. After all, it seems likely that most subjects of information in
ment investigations by knowing their results; it can only evaluate a decision by
having access to all the relevant information acquired by the government when
it made the decision. Thus, there may be a valid distinction between information
"passively" received by the government and "passively" used by it in routine
oversight procedures and information which it actively seeks for some more specific
narrow-range use. Under this analysis the second category of information should
be more "releasable" under the general policy of preventing secret government,
both of the FOIA and of the Privacy Act of 1974 as well.
441 U.S. at 292.
In Chrysler, the corporate plaintiff claimed that the requested information
was within the purview of exemption 4 (5 U.S.C. S 552(b)(4)) which exempts "trade
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential." Id. at 291.
41 5 U.S.C. S 702 (1976).
" Id. at S 552(b)(6).
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files not covered by the Privacy Act will not be aware of a request for
it until after the government has complied, if then. However, the issue
of whether there is a right of privacy capable of being violated in the
FOIA context must be answered first. If there is no such right, the issue
of notice is moot. If there is a right, it can then and only then be deter-
mined whether the nature of the right, balanced against the extreme em-
piric difficulties of providing notice to every subject of information in
every requested government file, demands that notice be given. The con-
sequent impediment to the legitimate goals of "open government" ex-
pressed in the FOIA would also have to be considered. It seems possible
that in the face of these difficulties notice may not be required and that
the right, if it exists, would be more appropriately vindicated by a civil
rights suit for damages under the Civil Rights Act49 or even under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.'0
V. FOIA EXEMPTION 6: PRIVACY
Section 552(b)(6) of the FOIA provides: "This section does not apply
to... personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."5 '
This exemption calls for an exception to the general rule of FOIA analysis
which balances the individual's interest in privacy against the public's
interests in disclosure. 52 In determining whether material falls within ex-
emption 6, the courts must apply "a policy that will involve a balancing
of interest between the protection of an individual's private affairs from
unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's right
19 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1976).
5 28 U.S.C. 5 2671 (1979). Any such tort suit, however, would be likely to
fail based upon the "discretionary function or duty" exception to the general rule
of federal tort liability contained in 28 U.S.C. S 2680(a) (1979).
5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
52 This may be contrasted to the general policy of FOIA in regard to privacy,
in which the agency's need for providing its clientele with privacy was paramount.
Illustrative of this is the Court's discussion of exemption 4 in Chrysler:
Congress appreciated that, with the expanding sphere of governmental
regulation and enterprise, much of the information within Government
files has been submitted by private entities seeking Government con-
tracts or responding to unconditional reporting obligations imposed by
law. There was sentiment that Government agencies should have the
latitude, in certain circumstances, to afford the confidentiality desired
by these submitters. But the congressional concern was with the agency's
need or preference for confidentiality; the FOIA by itself protects the
submitters' interest in confidentiality only to the extent that this interest
is endorsed by the agency collecting the information.
441 U.S. at 292-93 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). "The (b)(6) exemp-
tion was meant to protect individuals from the disclosure of the intimate details
of their personal lives." Disabled Officer's Ass'n v. Rumsfeld, 428 F. Supp. 454,
458 (D.D.C. 1977).
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to governmental information."' Thus, the government seemingly adopts
a more neutral role when exemption 6 is involved; the principal antagonists
are the public and the individual.
The concept of "similar files" has been of crucial importance in cases
concerning exemption 6.1 In a widely-followed Third Circuit decision, Wine
Hobby U.S.A., Inc. v. IRS,5 wherein a maker of wine-making equipment
sought the names and addresses of amateur wine-makers from the Internal
Revenue Service, the court stated:
We believe that the list of names and addresses is a "file" within
the meaning of Exemption (6). A broad interpretation of the
statutory term to include names and addresses is necessary to
avoid a denial of statutory protection in a case where release of
requested materials would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy. Since the thrust of the exemption is to avoid
unwarranted invasions of privacy, the term "files" should not be
given an interpretation that would often preclude inquiry into this
more crucial question.
Furthermore, we believe the list of names and addresses is a
file "similar" to the personnel and medical files specifically referred
to in the exemption. The common denominator in "personnel and
medical and similar files" is the personal quality of information
in the file, the disclosure of which may constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy. We do not believe that the
use of the term "similar" was intended to narrow the exemption
from disclosure and permit the release of files which would other-
wise be exempt because of the resultant invasion of privacy.56
Thus, data such as that contained on a union authorization card,"7 in
a Department of Agriculture study of housing containing various details
of family life,58 or the personal or criminal activities of a member of orga-
nized crime 59 may all be sufficiently "personal" to be eligible for exemp-
tion 6 coverage, as was the list of names and addresses of the amateur
wine-makers in Wine Hobby. The test is not whether information is of
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965).
See Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Committee on
Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977); Harbolt v. Department
of State, 616 F.2d 772 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980).
5 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 135. See also Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
s, Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980); Pacific Molasses
Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978); Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB,
556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
' Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
" Providence Journal v. FBI, 460 F. Supp. 762 (D.R.I. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 602 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1979).
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a "medical or personnel" character, but whether it is of a "personal
nature"6 which, compared to the type of information normally found in
medical or personnel files, "implicates similar privacy values."'" As one
circuit court stated, exemption 6
was designed to protect individuals from public disclosure of inti-
mate details of their lives, whether the disclosure be of personnel
files, medical files, or other similar files. The exemption is not
limited to Veterans' Administration or Social Security files, but
rather is phrased broadly to protect individuals from a wide range
of embarrassing disclosures.2
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia gave a good precis
of the test for determining whether disclosure of a "medical, personnel
or similar file" would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy":
In an opinion of Judge Wright [Getman v. N.L.R.B., 450 F.2d
670 (1971)], this court has previously considered the scope of the
"clearly unwarranted invasion" language .... We held that ex-
emption 6 involves a balancing of the interests of the individuals
in their privacy against the interests of the public being informed.
We noted that the statute "instructs the court to tilt the balance
in fa-er of disclos-irc." Specificvlly, we suggested that ;I balanc-
ing interests the court should first determine if disclosure would
constitute an invasion of privacy, and how severe an invasion. Sec-
ond, the court should weigh the public interest purpose of those
seeking disclosure and whether other sources of information might
suffice. Such balancing is unique for exemption 6; normally no in-
quiry into the use of the information is made, and the informa-
tion is made available to any person. 3
The Xanth University file would arguably pass the first portion of the
test for inclusion within exemption 6, since it is a file "similar" to a medical
or personnel file containing material of a "personal nature" or including
60 Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172, 1180 (5th Cir. 1978).
"1 Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 376 (1976).
62 Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted).
' Id. It is by no means certain that the circuit court was correct in its conten-
tion that the "public interest" which must be balanced against privacy interests
should be measured by the purpose of the requesters. It would seem more in
keeping with the spirit of the FOIA to measure the public interest by the effect
the information's release would have or tend to have on that interest. Calling
for an evaluation, in essence, of the "worthiness" of a FOIA requester creates
an unnecessary exception to the FOIA principle of disclosure. This, of course,
is in contrast to the necessary exception contended for by this Article. Making
a FOIA requester's success dependent on his purpose creates a vague standard
which is likely to be too prone to expansion.
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"intimate details." The facts about Doe which can be derived from the
Xanth file are similar to those protected in the union authorization card
cases 4 or in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Usery 5 In Metropolitan
Life, portions of reports submitted by insurance companies in compliance
with affirmative action requirements "which contain[ed] data on promo-
tions, job performance, job evaluations, and personal preferences and goals
[constituted] 'similar files' in that they reflect[ed] highly personal details
about company employees.""0 The more difficult question about the Doe
material in the Xanth file in the exemption 6 context is whether disclosure
is arguably "a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy."
The legislative history of the FOIA and judicial interpretations of the
FOIA are in agreement that, once a "medical" or "personnel" or "similar"
file is involved, the interests of the public in disclosure must be balanced
against the interest of an individual in keeping his private affairs private."
Further, there seems to be general agreement that "whether an invasion
is unwarranted or clearly unwarranted necessarily depends upon a
weighing of the interests on the other side." 8 These "interests on the
other side" include the interests of the party who has actually applied
for the information since, at the very least, he is a part of the "public"
whose "right to know" is included in any FOIA analysis. At a minimum,
his interest reflects a portion of the public interest. 9
" See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
65 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976).
66 Id. at 168. This case should be compared with Poss v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 654
(10th Cir. 1977), and Columbia Packing Co. v. Department of Agriculture, 563
F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1977). In Poss, the court determined that exemption 7C, which
exempts information gathered "for law enforcement purposes" from mandatory
release when such release would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy" did not apply to information gathered from fellow employees by the
NLRB about the firing of a worker. In the circumstances, the employees who
had spoken to the NLRB could have no high expectations of privacy, as they
knew they might eventually be called upon to testify. In Columbia Packing, while
the court found that meat inspectors, who had been convicted of taking bribes,
had considerable expectations of privacy in their personnel files, the public in-
terest in the circumstances of their corruption outweighed tle privacy interests
protected by exemption 6. Thus, in Poss there may be said to have been no inva-
sion of privacy, whereas in Columbia Packing there was an invasion, but it was
warranted by the public interest in corrupt public officials.
67 "The phrase 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' enunciates
a policy that will involve a balancing of interests between the protection of an
individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preserva-
tion of the public's right to governmental information." S. REP. No. 813, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965). See also Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133,
136 (3rd Cir. 1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 321 (1978).
69 Church of Scientology v. Department of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 746 (9th Cir.
1979); Campbell v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 539 F.2d 58, 61 (10th Cir. 1976); Ditlow
v. Schultz, 517 F.2d 166, 170-71 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,
675 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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As noted above, the proposed disclosure of information concerning facts
relative to an individual's employment, such as job performance, promo-
tion prospects and the like, has, on occasion, been sufficient to warrant
a finding that the material proposed for release was within exemption
6.7" The courts, in making such findings, have not ignored the potential
for embarrassment and ill-feeling between fellow employees if informa-
tion concerning them was made public. 1
In Metropolitan Life, portions of affirmative action reports filed by in-
surance companies were within exemption 6 because "the severity of the
potential invasion outweigh[ed] the factors favoring disclosure."72 The re-
quester in Metropolitan Life was the District of Columbia branch of the
National Organization for Women which sought to investigate whether
insurance companies were complying with the federal affirmative action
and equal employment mandates in regard to women and minority group
employees.7" The revelation of personal but job-connected facts about Doe,
as well as his opinions of his colleagues and his cult connection, will mean
a loss of control over this information, and will threaten him with monetary
and other injuries.
There would seem to be a legitimate public interest in the hypothesized
Xanth file since it contains information showing how public money, sup-
plied in the form of grants, was used. The information could conceivably
be helpful in the evaluation of criteria currently used to determine whether
to issue grant money and could be useful in formulating better criteria.74
Against this public interest, the privacy rights of Doe, and those of his
colleagues, would have to be balanced. It is not possible within the con-
straints of this Article to determine which set of interests must be of
-greater weight. The public's legitimate interest in the names of individual
recipients of grants, or in the fact that Doe lied to his colleagues to con-
ceal his connections with a religious cult, would most likely be minimal.
However, for purposes of this Article it is unimportant whether Doe will
win or lose his suit. What matters is that the requested information is
colorably within exemption 6 because, if he possesses a constitutional right
to informational privacy assertable in regard to the information, it would
seem that the Chrysler requirements for a right of action have been
satisfied.
Doe, in seeking to assert his own privacy interests under FOIA exemp-
tion 6, is in a different position from most litigants who have sought to
70 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976).
71 Id. at 168.
72 Id. at 169.
73 Id.
7' That the projected study for which material was being requested under
the FOIA might result in more efficient NLRB procedures was considered signifi-
cant by the court in Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where
the NLRB claimed, inter alia, that the release of the requested information would
violate exemption (b)(6) of the FOIA.
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use the exemption in the past. Typically, the claim that the privacy pro-
tected by exemption 6 is in danger of suffering a "clearly unwarranted
invasion" has been advanced by a government agency opposing the release
of information."5 Sometimes, the exemption is asserted by an employer
seeking to enjoin disclosure of information which would allegedly violate
the privacy of its employees."6 Only in rare and unusual circumstances
has the subject of information vulnerable to a claim of lying within exemp-
tion 6 been a party to the action."
The reasons for this are obvious. Seldom will the individual who is the
subject of information not covered by the "record which is part of a system
of records . . . recoverable by an identifying particular" requirement of
the Privacy Act have notice that an FOIA request has been received by
an agency for material including information concerning him before that
request has been answered." The empirical problems coupled with the
current absence of such notice renders it unlikely. In addition, the party
who goes to court seeking to protect his privacy often stands to lose more,
" See, e.g., Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Church of
Scientology v. Department of Army, 611 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1979); Pacific Molasses
Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978).
76 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976).
" The only case in which the circumstances have allowed the subject of files
to successfully invoke exemption 6 is Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp.
762 (D.R.I. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1071 (1980). See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
78 This problem is made particularly crucial by the apparent fact that:
Some agencies have reorganized their files in an effort to subvert or
avoid Privacy Act requirements. It has been reported that particular
organizations no longer file certain sensitive information in record systems
that are identified by personal information. Record systems which are
not identified by data personal to the subject are not covered by the
Privacy Act. Instead the Act covers information about an individual main-
tained in a system of records that is accessed by personal identifiers.
Critics point out that permitting the Act to be turned on and off by the
method of access is an open invitation to agencies to circumvent the Act.
Another device used by agencies to avoid Privacy Act requirements is
the creation of temporary or informal files. Material that should be placed
in permanent files (and that was previously contained in such files) is
now maintained informally and/or temporarily to avoid the creation of
files subject to Privacy Act regulation. The Department of Justice, for
example, no longer has a file for attorney applicants. Instead, resumes
and related correspondence are maintained in an informal manner, shuf-
fled from desk to desk and then destroyed when no longer needed.
Belair, Agency Implementation of the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information
Act: Impact of the Government's Collection, Maintenance and Dissemination of
Personally Identifiable Information, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 465, 487 (1977)
(footnotes omitted). The author of the above article was a consultant to the Com-
mission on Federal Paperwork for privacy and freedom of information issues.
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by his mere participation in such a suit, than he would gain from a
favorable court decision."9
As a general rule, an individual has standing only to vindicate his own
rights, not those of another,' though there are exceptions."' It is troubling
that in an area so beset with uncertainties, the rights and desires of a
person threatened with a possible invasion of his privacy should only have
the protection offered by a litigant with interests quite divergent from
his own.
It is inherent in this situation that the court, which decides a claim
of coverage under exemption 6, runs the risk of conclusively determining
the "interests" of an individual quite differently than that individual
reasonably would. A claim of "privacy interests" may be used as
camouflage for the desires of a party whose interest in concealment of
information may well be adverse to the interests of the subject of that
information. In addition, courts are forced into the dangerous realm of
speculation; in plain terms, they must guess the interests in privacy
possessed by the information's subject. The perils of such a situation,
which is virtually certain to continue unless a broad right in individuals
to bring reverse FOIA suits is recognized, can be illustrated by an ex-
amination of two FOIA suits in which rights of privacy were asserted.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Usery,"2 the District of Columbia
branch of the National Organization for Women (D.C. NOW) sought
documents relating to D.C. NOW, to various insurance companies' affir-
mative action programs, submitted by the companies themselves and
" The mere fact that one has brought a suit to prevent the release of personal
information may serve to advertise widely the fact that there is information one
wants to be kept secret. This was the problem the Supreme Court confronted
in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), wherein the NAACP was permitted
to assert its members' rights to anonymity because it would plainly have been
ludicrous, and possibly dangerous, to force an individual to step forward and
declare that he wished to keep it a secret that he belonged to the NAACP.
" The general rule is usually expressed that "a litigant may only assert his
own constitutional rights or immunities." United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,
22 (1960). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); California Bankers Ass'n
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
8 The exceptions depend upon the existence of "special circumstances" as
in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) ("a unique situation in which it is the
action of the state court which might result in a denial of constitutional rights
and in which it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights
are asserted to present their grievance before any court." Id, at 257.), and NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (association permitted to assert constitutional
rights of members because, in the circumstances of the case in which the central
issue was the right to prevent the release of the information that an individual
was a member of the NAACP, "[tlo require that it be claimed by members
themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its
assertion." Id. at 459.). See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
82 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976).
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reports on the same subject prepared by the government. 3 "Upon being
informed by the ICS [the Insurance Compliance Staff of the Social Security
Administration, to whom D.C. NOW's FOIA request was addressed] of
D.C. NOW's request, the insurance companies objected to disclosure, argu-
ing that the documents were exempted under sections (b)(3), (4), (6), and
(7) of the Act's exemptions."84
Over the companies' objections, the ICS determined to release most
of the requested material, deleting "[w]age and salary information, the
names, social security numbers, employee identification numbers, and
'other identifying information,' comments revealing the closing or reorga-
nization of a unit or units not already publicly disclosed, and training data
revealing entry into a new market. 's Subsequently, the insurance com-
panies brought a reverse FOIA action for a preliminary injunction against
the release of all the material relating to them, which was consolidated
with a suit D.C. NOW had brought before the final administrative deter-
mination to compel disclosure.8
In determining the applicability of section (b)(6) of the FOIA the court,
having determined that some of the material sought constituted " 'similar
files' in that they reflect[ed] highly personal details about company
employees,"8 proceeded de novo to "balance the severity of the invasion
of personal privacy with the public interest in disclosure with a 'tilt' in
favor of disclosure." 8 D.C. NOW claimed "that the public interest will
be served by disclosure in that D.C. NOW intends to use the information
to further the gials of equal employment opportunity and elimination of
discrimination in employment."8 The court balanced this claim against
the employees' privacy interests, as those interests were presented to
the court by the insurance companies. The court found that:
Much of the information, such as that concerning the employee's
personal preferences and goals and job performance evaluation
has little, if any, relevance to the public interest asserted. Thus
Id. at 154.
Id. at 154-55 (emphasis added).
85 Id. at 155.
SId.
87 Id. at 168. See also Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture,
498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
m 426 F. Supp. at 167. The district court applied the three-part test developed
in Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), and Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The test ap-
plied is as follows: "(1) the information must constitute personnel, medical or similar
files; (2) the disclosure of the information must constitute an invasion of personal
privacy; and (3) the severity of the invasion of personal privacy must outweigh
the public interest in disclosure." 426 F. Supp. at 166-67. This test, which is similar
to that used in other circuits, implies that no information is so private that its
release could not be mandated by imperative public interest concerns.
426 F. Supp. at 169.
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deletion of such information will have no effect on the public in-
terest asserted. Some of such information may be relevant to this
public interest. However, the information the disclosure of which
this Court feels would result in a substantial invasion of personal
privacy constitutes only a very small portion of the information
contained in the AAPS. Deletion of this small amount of informa-
tion should not significantly impair the achievement of D.C. NOW's
goal. To the extent that any impairment may result from non-
disclosure, the severity of the invasion outweighs such an impair-
ment to the achievement of the public interest."
In a situation such as the one presented in Metropolitan Life, the privacy
interests of the employees are not as easily discerned as the court in-
dicated. Certainly, the possibility existed that women and minority group
employees would choose, if the choice were theirs, that information about
them already possessed by their employers and the government be put
in the possession of D.C. NOW. If either women or minority group
employees, or both, were not receiving the full benefit of affirmative action
requirements, the potential benefit to them from disclosure of this fact
might reasonably outweigh for them any potential privacy infringements.
Potential class actions were stifled by the court's deletion of names for
"privacy" reasons. No one knows what the employees saw their interests
as being; they were never asked, nor were they represented in the suit.
Instead, two self-appointed defenders of their interest, D.C. NOW and
the insurance companies, fought to a temporary conclusion a battle whose
outcome plainly concerned the employees' welfare. The government's role
was virtually that of a neutral stakeholder.
That the interests of the employees in regard to privacy were con-
sidered by the court in Metropolitan Life is almost accidental. If the
insurance companies had not opposed the release of the information re-
quested by D.C. NOW, or had they not been informed of the D.C. NOW
request, the employees' interests presumably would not have been raised.
The privacy interests of the employees, however, remain the same
whether or not advanced by their employers. If an "unwarranted" inva-
sion would take place because of the release of names and personal data,
that invasion would take place regardless of the insurance companies' at-
tempt to vindicate their own reverse FOIA claims. A system which deter-
mines whether an individual's privacy is to be "unwarrantedly" invaded
solely on the basis of whether another party, whose own "privacy" is not
necessarily threatened, chooses to assert that individual's interests, re-
quires substantial justification for its existence. Such justification does
not seem readily apparent.
In Providence Journal Co. v. FBI,9 the government took a more active
90 Id.
9 460 F. Supp. 762 and 460 F. Supp. 778 (D.R.I. 1978), rev'd, 602 F.2d 1010
(1st Cir. 1979).
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role. Having learned of the existence of logs and memoranda of an illegal
wiretap of an alleged organized crime figure's telephone conversations,
a Rhode Island newspaper made an FOIA request for them to the FBI.
The paper "intended to publish the documents and to use them as the
basis for investigative reporting."92 There was reason to believe that at
least some of the conversations reported in the documents sought were
either with or concerned various Rhode Island public officials.93 The sub-
ject of the illegal electronic surveillance, Raymond S. Patriarca, sought
to protect his interests by intervening as a defendant. His motion to inter-
vene was strenuously opposed by the government defendant, the FBI.
The FBI claimed that it would adequately assert Mr. Patriarca's privacy
interest and that his motion for intervention should be denied. The district
court noted, somewhat sardonically:
Mr. Patriarca's reluctance to rely on the Department of Justice
to protect his privacy is understandable. Having been the sub-
ject of continuous electronic surveillance by the F.B.I. for three
years and the object of a successful United States prosecution
for, among other charges, the use of the telephone in interstate
commerce with the intent to commit murder and to further an
unlawful gambling enterprise [citation omitted], Mr. Patriarca need
not now rely on any supposed identity of interest between himself
and the Government in keeping the fruits of its electronic
surveillance confidential."94
Both FOIA exemption 6 and exemption 7(c) (an exemption which af-
fords "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" a
protection similar, though not identical, to that afforded by exemption
6: protection against "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"9 ) were
at issue in the case. Its general posture was that of the standard FOIA
case: a private party sought to force disclosure of a governmental file.
The public interest at stake was substantial. Access by the newspapers
to the products of the surveillance gave every promise of helping to ex-
pose the corruption of government officials. It is difficult not to share
in the district court's suspicion that the motives of the FBI in preventing
disclosure were separate and apart from those of Mr. Patriarca in seek-
ing to intervene. Patriarca sought to prevent the details of his private
life from becoming public and to prevent the revelation of possible wrong-
doing on his and his associates' part. The FBI was seeking to prevent
the revelation of the extent of its own wrongdoing and to prevent possi-
ble embarrassment occasioned by the inevitable publicity attendant upon
the release of their illegally acquired information."
92 460 F. Supp. at 764.
93 Id.
9 Id. at 766.
91 5 U.S.C. S 552(b)(7)(C) (1976).
"For it [disclosure] might show the public that the F.B.I.'s reliance on il-
legal surveillance techniques altogether foreclosed its obtaining admissible
1982]
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The district court allowed Mr. Patriarca to intervene in this matter
in which large portions of the requested information dealt with details
of Mr. Patriarca's personal and family life. 7
Mr. Patriarca has a particular, unique interest with regard to
the logs and memoranda which differs from the more general in-
terest which the Government has in protecting privacy and fulfill-
ing its obligation under FOIA. The personal nature of the privacy
interest makes intervention especially appropriate; denial of inter-
vention with the resulting dependence on the Government is espe-
cially onerous. No one can better assert an interest in personal
privacy than the person whose privacy is at stake.8
Despite the fact that "the person whose privacy is at stake" has the
most powerful motivations to maintain his privacy and is the party most
likely to force an adequate consideration of his rights, only an individual
of unusual perseverance will manage to be heard when intimate facts con-
tained in a file not covered by the Privacy Act are to be revealed. In
fact, if the government chooses not to oppose the release of such informa-
tion following the FOIA's "general disclosure" principle, the affected
person may not know that intimate facts have become "public knowledge"
until after disclosure. In many respects, most of the American public is
in Mr. Patriarca's position. They too have been the subject of wide-ranging
and sometimes wrongful surveillance by the government. They too are
asked to trust the protection of their privacy interests to the govern-
ment whose actions created the threat of invasion. Americans should not
be required to "rely on any supposed identity of interest between
[themselves] and the government." The interests of the government are
not those of the individual. A government agency may well be indifferent,
or even hostile, to the privacy interests of the subjects of its files. The
general advice of our Constitution is not to "rely upon the government
to protect your rights;" instead, it is to "rely upon your rights to protect
yourself from the government." If there is no constitutionally-based right
to protect individuals from unwarranted government revelations of their
private affairs, then the privacy of every citizen is at the mercy of chance.
Absent a constitutional right, the protection of privacy would depend upon
the discretion of a bureaucracy which is given incentive to release informa-
tion by the consequent freedom from lengthy FOIA litigation and which
possesses no powerful counter-incentive to cherish and protect privacy.9
evidence of crimes. Disclosure might also show other failures of investigation
and prosecution." 460 F. Supp. at 773.
460 F. Supp. at 789-90.
460 F. Supp. at 766 (emphasis added).
The FOIA provides for a suit in federal district court to be brought by
an unsuccessful FOIA requester seeking that the agency in question be enjoined
from withholding the requested records. 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). The proceed-
ings are to be expedited. Id. at S 552(a)(4)(D). If the complainant "has substantially
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VI. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A SOURCE OF STANDING
FOR THE REVERSE FOIA LITIGANT
At first glance, it may seem anomalous to press the first amendment
into service in the cause of suppressing information. After all, the princi-
ple guardian of the right to free speech is traditionally thought of as
guaranteeing speech, not as imposing silence. Nonetheless, the right of
free speech is itself endangered if private information is given undesired
and unnecessary publicity. As indicated below, such "freedom of associa-
tion" cases as NAACP v. Alabama"° recognized that publicity given to
certain facts can powerfully inhibit the rights protected by the first
amendment.
According to the philosopher and legal theorist Alexander Meiklejohn:
"The First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects
the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which
we 'govern.' It is concerned not with a principle right, but with a public
power, a governmental responsibility."'' 1 This "freedom of thought and
communication" can only be effective if some right of privacy is included
in the guarantees of the first amendment. The governing process covers
more than the political activities and actions by which the State is ruled,
policy is chosen, leaders are elected. The right to take part in the govern-
ing process includes the right of self-government: the right to make up
one's mind; to make an informed choice regarding legal options. Meikle-
john's analysis does not go far enough. The first amendment must secure
the power of individual self-governance or the "public power" it guarantees
is meaningless. It is paradoxical to speak of the right to make political
choices if the right to make personal choices is unprotected.
NAACP v. Alabama is typical of a line of Supreme Court cases recogniz-
ing both a right and a need to keep information secret in certain circum-
prevailed" the court "may assess against the United States reasonable attorney
fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred .... " Id. at S 552(a)(4)(E).
The Privacy Act of 1974 provides for suits only when its provisions are violated
and thus does not provide for an action brought to prevent the release of informa-
tion about an individual not contained in a Privacy Act "system of records." Id.
at S 552(a)(G).
The likelihood of a standard FOIA suit being brought to force a release of
information when a request is refused, combined with the large volume of access
requests being handled by a federal bureaucracy in difficult economic times, makes
it probable that an agency will make the considerable effort required to protect
individual privacy threatened by material in files not covered by the Privacy
Act only when the agency's institutional interests are implicated. In short, other
factors being equal, an agency will cause itself more trouble and expenditure
of resources by refusing to release requested information than by complying with
the request.
,01 357 U.S. 449 (1978).
"' Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245,
255.
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stances in order to protect first amendment values. In NAACP v. Alabama,
the State of Alabama sought the membership lists of the Alabama branch
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Fear-
ing, among other things, that the membership lists might become public
and expose its membership to reprisals, the NAACP refused to supply
the lists to the state. The Supreme Court upheld the NAACP's refusal,
noting that "[tihis Court has recognized the vital relationship between
freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations."'1 "
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech .... Of course,
it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by the
association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural
matters .... "'
In NAACP v. Alabama and such successor cases as Shelton v. Tucker1 04
and Bates v. Little Rock,1"5 the Court recognized both the intimate rela-
tion between first amendment rights of free speech and privacy, as well
as the dangers posed to free speech by the possibility that the state may
publicize private facts. These cases dealt with the private fact of member-
ship in a controversial association. There seems to be no reason why the
principle does not extend to the revelation of other private facts as well.
The possibility that the government will reveal that a person informed
on his colleagues, flunked out of college or authored the screenplay for
a pornographic movie, serve as examples of titillating facts which might
be revealed in response to an FOIA request. While the public may be
interested in such facts, in terms of monitoring the government the revela-
tion of such facts normally will not serve the public interest.
Just as the possibility that an individual's membership in the NAACP
might be revealed chilled the self-governing rights of that organization's
members, the possibility that the information about individuals contained
in government files may be released to any applicant chills the ability
to conduct life and make choices between various legal options. The FOIA,
without a strongly based individual right of action for the reverse FOIA
litigant, means that any action taken at any point in an individual's life
may someday be revealed. The information may come into government
hands from innumerable routes. Former employers, colleagues, acquain-
tances or associates may respond to government queries. Even if the
government is not making a particular effort to discover facts about a
given individual, the sheer magnitude and variety of information collected
102 357 U.S. at 462.
103 Id. at 460.
104 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
105 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
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by the government means it will have information about most American
citizens. Much of this information will be in files not covered by the Privacy
Act. The inhibiting effect of an ever-present possibility that any act or
expression by a private individual may someday be released by the govern-
ment into the public domain is necessarily devastating to first amend-
ment values.
Whalen v. Roe' °6 was the occasion for a serious analysis of privacy in-
terests by the Supreme Court. The case concerned a New York statute
which mandated the creation and preservation for five years after the
event, of a state maintained record of every prescription of a "dangerous"
drug, complete with the name and address of its user and the prescribing
doctor. °7 Extraordinary measures had been taken by the state to preserve
the confidentiality of the information obtained under the statute, including
steel fences, barriers to illicit attempts to "eavesdrop" by means of com-
puter technology, and criminal penalties for the revelation of the iden-
tities of the subjects of the records. °8
Given the circumstances of the case, the serious problem with which
the statute dealt (abuse of dangerous drugs) and the extraordinary precau-
tions New York State had taken, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
found the statute to be constitutional.
Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty [to avoid
disclosures of personal information] arguably has its roots in the
Constitution, nevertheless New York's statutory scheme, and its
implementing administrative procedure, evidence a proper con-
cern with, and protection of the individual's interest in privacy.
... We simply hold that this record does not establish an inva-
sion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'
First amendment rights, of course, only restrict the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Justice Brennan, Meiklejohn's foremost proponent
on the Court,"0 stated in concurrence that "[t]he Court recognize[d] that
an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters is an
aspect of the right of privacy."' .
In Whalen, no right was invaded because the State had taken extreme
precautions to prevent the revelation of a private fact: that an individual
is taking "dangerous" drugs. The revelation of such a fact might cause
108 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
107 Id. at 593.
108 Id. at 594-95.
109 Id. at 605-06.
110 Meiklejohn's influence on Justice Brennan is plainly discernible in Brennan,
The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965). See also Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy:
The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41 (1974).
... 429 U.S. at 606.
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harm to its subject, in regard to his employment, social life and reputa-
tion. Unlike the New York statute in Whalen, however, the FOIA does
not take precautions against invasions of privacy caused by the revela-
tion of facts in the government's possession. Indeed, its sole purpose is
disclosure; the only "protection" given to privacy is the rather flimsy shield
of agency discretion if the projected invasion of privacy is clearly
unwarranted."'
The two-stage conceptualization of freedom of expression proposed by
the author of the article, Privacy in the First Amendment,"3 is useful here.
Although the Court has never set out the elements of the free-
expression system, its operation would seem to require two
separate stages. Transmission of information from speaker to
listener is only the first; the second is the application of that
information - in the mind of the person who receives it - to the
individual decisions of self-governance ....
Both stages of the process are needed to achieve what, in the
Court's view, the Constitution envisions: free individual choice by
each citizen. Yet the Court, in applying its concept of a system
of free expression, has concerned itself almost solely with the first
stage of that system -the process of communicating information
from speaker to listener. In the context of that first stage, the
Court has recognized that participation of individuals in a free-
expression system can be inhibited, or chilled, in a variety of ways
and that the result is to diminish the self-governing rights of at
least those individuals."'
Both stages are implicated in the reverse FOIA situation. In the first
stage, there is a direct chilling effect on speech itself which arises out
of the possibility that the contents of expression will be stored in govern-
ment files for subsequent release. The second stage right, however, may
even be more significant. The right to speak is of little value if there
is not a right to listen and reflect.
This second stage right, which is related to the right of privacy as "con-
trol of information about oneself," has been presented to the Court in
such cases as Laird v. Tatum"5 and Nixon v. Administrator of General
12 The careful balancing performed by the Supreme Court in the line of "public
figure/defamation" cases from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and beyond is yet another
example of the close relation between rights of speech and rights of privacy.
The first amendment rights of the press were weighed in those cases against
the first amendment rights of the parties claiming defamation. That the "informa-
tion" involved was false seemed to shift the balance a bit away from the press.
That a party was a "public figure" and, in some sense, had courted publicity,
served to shift the balance the other way.
11 Comment, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462 (1973).
114 Id. at 1464.
"1 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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Services."' Often, as in Laird, where individual litigants declared
themselves to be "chilled" in their exercise of first amendment rights
by the mere existence of a system of Army surveillance of citizens' ac-
tivities, the claim has failed because the Court has not discerned that
the litigants have suffered the "injury in fact" required for them to have
standing. Yet, if there is such a right based upon the first amendment
as posited here, a reverse FOIA suit may be the more appropriate forum
to raise it.
In a reverse FOIA suit, the plaintiff is claiming that he is threatened
by a direct and personal injury. The loss of privacy may have economic
consequences and damage reputations. An unwarranted invasion of privacy
has long been recognized as the basis for a tort action. A court in a reverse
FOIA suit may examine the contested material in camera. With a con-
crete set of facts and real injury threatened, a court can properly balance
the competing constitutional rights. Additionally, equity powers can be
used to carve out a result reasonably protecting the rights of all interested
parties.
In the context of Professor Doe's reverse FOIA suit, a claim that his
first amendment right of informational privacy is threatened by the pro-
posed release of the file containing information from and about him seems
to have substance. The threat to his interests is material: economic loss
since his teaching career might be damaged by the release of informa-
tion, as well as damage to his right to associate since others may be re-
pelled by the intimate facts learned about him. The "concrete injury" which
Doe may suffer is far greater than that alleged by the unsuccessful plain-
tiffs in Laird"' and United States v. Richardson."' Indeed, the privacy
rights of the chairman of Doe's department are also implicated. If the
information Doe gave the Department of Education is revealed, pursuant
to the FOIA request, the chairman will, in effect, be punished without
having an opportunity to present a defense, unless he possesses his own
reverse FOIA right of action."9
At least one court has held that the Privacy Act of 1974 and the FOIA
are to be read and construed together." The Privacy Act itself recognizes
the relationship between privacy and the first amendment in its prohibi-
tion of governmental information gathering on first amendment activities
except in extraordinary circumstances. The Act reads in pertinent part:
116 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
117 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
"' 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
"' It will, indeed, be a case of locking the barn after the horse is stolen for
the chairman to bring his reverse FOIA action after the information is released.
Even if he can justify his action, his explanation seems unlikely to catch up to
the mildly scandalous revelation.
" Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980);
see also Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1980).
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Each agency that maintains a system of records shall ... (7) main-
tain no record describing how any individual exercises rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized
by statute or by the individual about whom the record is main-
tained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized
law enforcement authority.'2'
This is especially significant as it indicates first amendment roots for a
"right" of informational privacy in the context of a statute including con-
gressional recognition that "the right to privacy is a personal and funda-
mental right protected by the Constitution of the United States."'22
What constitutes "a record describing how any individual exercises
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment" is not entirely clear. If con-
strued as including even incidental descriptions of expressive actions (in
files whose primary focus is not upon expression as such), it might ex-
clude most descriptions of what citizens do, with the trivial exception
of those expressive actions which might be characterized as "obscenity"
or as "fighting words.""'2 Plainly, Congress did not, in passing the Privacy
Act, intend to create such an extreme limitation of the information which
might be gathered by the federal government. The ambiguity of the
Privacy Act's provision, along with the difficulty of its being effectively
enforced, seems likely to reduce its impact and make it little more, legally,
than a congressional endorsement of the first amendment.
The acceptance of the above analysis would not, of course, mean that
Doe would necessarily succeed in having the information about him sup-
pressed, or even having identifying factors deleted. When constitutional
rights clash (and there would seem to be a first amendment right assert-
able by the information-requester here) there must be a balancing. "The
Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its resolution."'24
121 5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(e)(7) (1976).
... Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. S 552a note (1976).
11 The Supreme Court has never receded from Justice Murphy's statement
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), that
[t~here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.
Id. at 571-72. While one might take issue with the phrase "well-defined," especially
in terms of recent obscenity decisions, there can be no question that the classes
of expressive conduct not protected by the first amendment are, indeed, "nar-
rowly limited."
.. Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975).
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* VII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS A SOURCE OF STANDING
FOR THE REVERSE FOIA LITIGANT
In the 1967 decision of Warden v. Hayden,"' Justice Brennan stated
for the majority that: "We have recognized that the principal object of
the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property,
and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers based
on property concepts."'26 Later that same year, in the landmark Katz v.
United States' decision, the Court, while finding that "the Fourth Amend-
ment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to pri-
vacy,' "" established a test for fourth amendment protection which rested
on privacy principles:
[T~he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. [Cita-
tions omitted]. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected .129
Since Katz, the Supreme Court has applied the "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" test derived from Justice Harlan's concurrence in that
case. "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior deci-
sions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have ex-
hibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'""
This requirement of actual expectation seems to be antithetic to the spirit
of the Katz decision. It is odd, to say the least, to deny the application
of Katz to a person in a coma, though such an individual may well have,
for the moment, no actual expectations.1
3
'
125 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
,26 Id. at 304.
121 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
128 Id. at 350.
129 Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
130 Id. at 361.
131 An actual subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in
a statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amend-
ment protects. It can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from
an individual's claim to fourth amendment protection. If it could, the
government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy
merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being
advanced by a decade and we were all forthwith being placed under com-
prehensive electronic surveillance.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384
(1974).
Professor Amsterdam noted that Justice Harlan had second thoughts about
his formulation in Katz: "The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search
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The Supreme Court has handed down many fourth amendment deci-
sions since 1967 and its view of the extent of coverage afforded by the
amendment has narrowed. In Katz, Justice Black, the lone dissenter, based
his dissent on his belief that the fourth amendment by its terms covered
only tangible things, i.e., things which were physical and therefore capable
of being "particularly described" for purposes of a warrant and being
"seized." Mr. Katz's telephone conversation, which agents overheard by
"bugging" his phone with a "bug" placed outside the booth, was simply
not tangible enough to be the subject of a "search" or "seizure" and was
therefore outside the coverage of the fourth amendment.132 While it has
not yet reached so literalist a position, the Supreme Court of late has
unquestionably been less inclined to see the language of the fourth amend-
ment as "the skin of the living thought that dwells within."' 13
Still, whether they are the essence of fourth amendment protections
or merely the result of ingenious judicial constructions beginning with
Ex Parte Jacksont" and Boyd v. United States, 35 privacy concerns now
seem to be an inextricable ingredient in fourth amendment analysis. In
this regard, it is important that the fourth amendment does not speak
solely to criminal investigations. Rather, it protects "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures."'13' The majority of government
searches and seizures which result in court decisions are indeed related
to criminal or quasi-criminal investigations, but this is not of decisive im-
port. Unfortunately, the large number of cases concerning the exclusionary
rule, and their controversial nature, seem to obscure the role the fourth
amendment can play outside the criminal context.
Thus, in Providence Journal Co. v. FBI,1 37 Chief Judge Pettine noted
that most of the recent Supreme Court fourth amendment cases have
dealt with the peculiar circumstances surrounding the application of the
exclusionary rule and have involved difficult decisions weighing the deter-
rent effect of the rule on police misconduct against the social costs of
excluding otherwise probative evidence from criminal trials.
The Court has, by and large, not addressed the general rule,
for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our ex-
pectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of the laws
that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present." United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (dissenting opinion). See also Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
132 389 U.S. 347, 364-67, 372 (1967).
Amsterdam, supra note 131, at 433.
13 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
135 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
136 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13 460 F. Supp. 762 ID.R.I. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 1010 (1st
Cir. 1979).
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derived from the reasonableness clause, which protects the privacy
of life and a person's self-respect by preventing the use of informa-
tion for impermissible governmental objectives, and by prevent-
ing the disclosure of private information obtained by searches so
broad and improper, in method, scope or purpose, that no warrant
could ever issue to authorize them."8
The Providence Journal case concerned the efforts of the FBI and the
subject of an illegal wiretap to prevent the release of logs and memoranda
of tapped conversations to a newspaper which intended to publish and
use them as the basis for investigative reports on organized crime. The
district court stated that "the recent Supreme Court cases, while instruc-
tive on the deterrent rationale, do not foreclose this Court's protecting
private information under the fourth amendment."1 39 In the particular
circumstances of Providence Journal, the Court found that the subject
had waived his fourth amendment right to prevent disclosure by allow-
ing eleven years to lapse after he learned of the tap and the records
thereof before he attempted to make use of available remedies to have
the relevant records sealed. 4 '
While still haunted by property concepts, the Supreme Court sometimes
seems willing to almost turn the fourth amendment on its head. That
is, instead of examining the circumstances to determine if there was a
search and/or seizure and then, if there was one, whether it was
"unreasonable," the Court has first decided that something "unreasonable"
has occurred and then characterized that something as a search or seizure
and therefore forbidden by the fourth amendment. Justice Brennan's ma-
jority opinion in Warden v. Hayden' characterized the decision in Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States' as follows: "Recognition that the
role of the fourth amendment was to protect against invasions of privacy
demanded a remedy to condemn the seizure of Silverthorne, although no
possible common law claim existed for the return of the copies made by
the government of the papers it had seized."'" In other words, because
there had been an invasion of privacy, the fourth amendment was to be
construed as providing relief. In Professor Amsterdam's view, "Katz held,
as Boyd had, that whatever 'is a material ingredient and effects the sole
object and purpose of search and seizure' is a search and seizure in the
only sense that the Constitution demands.' 4
If "the role of the Fourth Amendment ... [is] to protect against inva-
"' 460 F. Supp. at 773 n.29.
139 Id.
Id. at 774-75.
' 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
"' 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
'13 387 U.S. at 305.
.. Amsterdam, supra note 131, at 384 (footnote omitted) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
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sions of privacy," its role in the reverse FOIA suit is plain. It should
be irrelevant that the invasions of privacy caused by the government will
result from compliance with the FOIA policy of full disclosure, rather
than from police activities. Just as "[p]rivacy is disturbed no more by
a search directed to a purely evidentiary object than it is by a search
directed to an instrumentality, fruits or contraband,"'45 it is disturbed no
less by an invasion by the government in aid of "the public's right to
know" than by one in aid of the detection, punishment, or prevention of
crimes. Although the government may have initially acquired the private
information pursuant to some legitimate governmental objective, the
unreasonableness of releasing information when such a release causes an
unwarranted invasion of privacy is not altered. It would seem incontestable
that the same information which could be reasonably sought for the pur-
pose of convicting a person of dealing in drugs could not be reasonably
sought by the government for the sole purpose of being leaked to the
press in order to discredit an individual's political views.'46
The damage which can be done by disclosing intimate facts about an
individual's life is evident from such cases as Sidis v. F-R Publishing
Corp.'47 in which The New Yorker magazine published a "profile" of a
reclusive former child prodigy, who committed suicide shortly after losing
his case against them for invasion of privacy, and Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, where the California Supreme Court addressed the "consequences
of revelations [that the petitioner had a criminal past] in this case-
ostracism, isolation, and the alienation of one's family .... .14
An argument likely to be raised against the above analysis and claim
that FOIA-based release of information can give rise to an invasion of
privacy forbidden by the fourth amendment, is that there is simply no
"privacy" to be invaded under the circumstances. All information in
government hands is, in a sense, "public information." What is more, the
privacy of an individual as to information possessed by the government
has already been breached, either by himself or someone else who has
given this information to the government. The fourth amendment gives
no protection to a person against a "friend" who supplied information
to the government, Hoffa v. United States;149 or against an informant wired
... Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967). In Warden, the "mere evidence"
rule, which distinguished the instrumentalities or fruits of a crime, contraband
and weapons by which the escape of an arrested person might be made, which
could be seized, from "merely evidentiary material," which could not be validly
seized, even under a search warrant, was found not to be required by the fourth
amendment. The analysis used by Justice Brennan, in his opinion for the Court,
focused on the severity of potential invasions of privacy as the key to determin-
ing the applicability of the amendment.
146 For an incisive discussion of this point see Amsterdam, supra note 131,
at 372-74, 434-39, and the cases cited therein.
147 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
14' 4 Cal. 3d 529, 542, 483 P.2d 34, 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 875 (1971).
149 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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for sound by the government, United States v. White;'5 or against the
telephone company making, at government request, a list of all the
telephone numbers a person dials, Smith v. Maryland;151 or against a bank
being required to keep a record of depositor's transactions, California
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz;'52 or against a bank revealing these records to
government agents, United States v. Miller.
1
5
The Miller decision is especially interesting in this regard. There, an
alleged "moonshiner" was protesting a subpoena of records of his bank-
ing transactions which his banks had kept in accordance with the require-
ments of the Bank Secrecy Act.' The Supreme Court found that Congress
had assumed, in passing the Bank Secrecy Act, that there was no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in bank records. "The depositor takes the
risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be con-
veyed by that person to the government." '155 Here, as in California Bankers
and various other fourth amendment decisions, the Court seemed to use
an over-simplistic "all-or-nothing" notion of privacy. Once an individual
lets information about himself slip from his exclusive possession, without
some express and reasonable assurance of confidentiality, at least so long
as it is his privacy as to that information is relinquished.
1 5
1
The model of privacy used by the Court in these cases cannot be recon-
ciled with the Katz "reasonable expectations" test. It is untrue that our
society considers it the only reasonable course to treat all friends and
acquaintances as actual or potential government "agents." If every bit
of personal data is revealed at one's peril and there is then no further
150 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
151 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
152 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
153 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
154 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (1976).
155 425 U.S. at 443.
156 This approach is typified by such decisions as Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979), where the Court determined that no reasonable expectation of privacy
was violated when the telephone company turned over to federal investigators
the records of telephone numbers dialed from a criminal suspect's telephone; a
telephone user was aware of the fact that the numbers he dialed might be recorded
by the telephone company for billing purposes. See also California Bankers Ass'n
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 93 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall reaf-
firmed his view in his dissenting opinion in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
749-50 (1979), where he said:
Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all.
... In my view, whether privacy expectations are legitimate within the
meaning of Katz depends not on the risks an individual can be presumed
to accept when imparting information to third parties, but on the risks
he should be forced to assume in a free and open society. By its terms,
the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures
assigns to the judiciary some prescriptive responsibility.
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control over its dissemination, then privacy can only be maintained at
a cost of absurd and anti-social secrecy. Only in a police state is such
a course the sole "reasonable" one.
A powerful implicit criticism of the "all or nothing" view can be found
in Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County."5 7 In Burrows,
the California Supreme Court construed the California Constitution's
equivalent of the fourth amendment according to the principles of Katz.
The case involved the acquisition of a lawyer's financial statements from
his bank without a warrant or court process. In determining that the
lawyer's reasonable expectations of privacy had been frustrated, the court,
per Chief Justice Mosk, stated:
The mere fact that the bank purports to own the records which
it provided to the detective is not, in our view, determinative of
the issue at stake. The disclosure by the depositor to the bank
is made for the limited purpose of facilitating the conduct of his
financial affairs; it seems evident that his expectation of privacy
is not diminished by the bank's retention of a record of such dis-
closures. . . . It is not the right of privacy of the bank but of the
petitioner which is at issue, and thus it would be untenable to con-
clude that the bank, a neutral entity with no significant interest
in the matter, may validly consent to an invasion of its depositors'
rights.
For all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or
business firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely
volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life
of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account. In
the course of such dealings, a depositor may reveal many aspects
of his personal affairs, opinions, habits and associations. Indeed,
the totality of bank records provides a virtual current biography.
... To permit a police officer access to these records merely upon
his request, without any judicial control as to relevancy or other
traditional requirements of legal process, and to allow the evidence
to be used in any subsequent criminal prosecution against a defen-
dant, opens the door to a vast and unlimited range of very real
abuses of police power." 8
In a reverse FOIA situation, there are certain striking resemblances
to the circumstances dealt with by Chief Justice Mosk. Just as it is "im-
possible to participate in the economic life of modern society without main-
taining a bank account," thereby giving the bank a "virtual current
biography," so is it impossible to participate in life in the United States
157 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1975).
158 Id. at 244, 247, 529 P.2d at 594, 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170, 172 (emphasis
added).
[Vol. 31:455
36https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss3/7
REVERSE FOIA LITIGATION
without leaving the materials for a detailed portrait of oneself scattered
in the files of various federal agencies.'59 Just as the bank is "a neutral
entity with no significant interest in the matter," the federal government
is a neutral entity in the reverse FOIA situation. It possesses the informa-
tion requested but, save for the requirements of the FOIA, it is hard
to conceive that the government "cares" whether much of its information
is released; whether the requester achieves his interest or whether his
interest be prurient, sternly scientific or somewhere in between.
To paraphrase Justice Mosk's reasoning, it is not the right of the federal
government, but of the subject of the requested information which is at
issue, and thus it would be untenable to conclude that the government,
a neutral entity with no significant interest in the matter, may validly
consent to an invasion of the subject's rights. Of course, the government
does consent in the majority of cases to release the information "without
any judicial control as to relevancy or other traditional requirements of
legal process."'6
In some ways, the release of information by the government in the
reverse FOIA situation is even worse than the release of information by
the bank in Burrows. The police generally have a socially palatable motive
for their searches and seizures, viz., the prevention of crime or the appre-
hension of criminals. Even so, except in very limited situations, police
may only search and seize on the basis of a warrant satisfying fourth
amendment requirements. The FOIA requester need go to no neutral
magistrate. The slightest whim on his part, or the most vile intent, will
serve to support his request. The preservation and extension of "open
government" are valuable goals, but are they more important than deal-
ing with crime? Are there truly valid reasons why a citizen's privacy,
threatened by a criminal investigation, must be protected by elaborate
constitutionally-based procedural requirements, but privacy threatened
by an FOIA request, can command only the shaky defenses offered by
the Privacy Act? It is submitted here that there are not and the fourth
amendment provides a constitutional basis for the protection of privacy
' See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET REPORT, supra note 5. At the end
of 1978, more than 100 distinct federal agencies were administering almost 6,000
systems of records on almost 3,652,600,000 individuals. A mere listing of Privacy
Act of 1974 "systems of records" as of the end of 1978 occupied 183 closely-printed
pages in an appendix to the OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET REPORT. The
individual who could live in the United States and not supply at least the outlines
of his life story through his social security filings, applications for government
loans or government-approved mortgages, and the countless other materials filed
with federal agencies would need to be cautious and wily to an almost unimaginable
degree. Some may take comfort in the thought that if our civilization were to
perish tomorrow, but our records survive, future archeologists would be able
to reconstruct our individual daily lives in great detail.
'" Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 247, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 166, 172 (1975).
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and should be construed as providing standing for the reverse FOIA
litigant.
Part of the reason the Supreme Court has seemed to take a somewhat
narrow view of the privacy protections of the fourth amendment is because
they are often invoked in situations in which the fourth amendment is
advanced to support the exclusion of otherwise probative evidence in a
criminal trial which has a large social cost. The Court has narrowly focused
on the "wrongdoer" in such cases as Hoffa where the Court indicated
that: "Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the
view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief
that a person to whom he confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it";"'
and United States v. White where the Court stated that: "If the law gives
no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes
a police agent, neither should it protect him when that same agent has
recorded or transmitted the conversations . 1..."'62 This narrow focus tends
to distort the view of the fourth amendment. Of course, the "wrongdoer"
should not be protected. The unhappy fact is, however, that there seems
to be no way that the ordinary law-abiding citizen can enjoy his right
to privacy unless the wrongdoer receives incidental benefits. The entire
purpose of the fourth amendment is skewed when treated as dealing with
only two classes: wrongdoers and police. The principles which underlie
the fourth amendment, as was understood as long ago as 1765 in Entick
v. Carrington,3 underlie the "right to be let alone" which is basic in a
democratic society. This right is threatened by the denial of reverse FOIA
standing under current interpretations of the law.
Returning to the hypothetical situation, both Professor Doe and the
chairman of his department have assertable fourth amendment rights in
regard to the proposed release of the Xanth University file. It is arguably
unreasonable for the government to divulge the fact Doe is a cult member,
and, though somewhat less so, that the chairman misused his grant. Only
by a balancing of the public interest in the various facts contained in the
file can the issue of "unreasonableness" be determined.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Of the two amendments considered, the fourth, on the whole, is a more
likely source for the "plus" factor in the Chrysler v. Brown "10(a) plus"
formula than the first amendment, in regard to a non-commercial reverse
FOIA litigant such as Professor Doe. The connection between the first
amendment's protection of free speech and Doe's claim of a right to pre-
vent the government from releasing information he had supplied is real,
but perhaps too attenuated. After all, it might be argued, Doe knew of
161 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (emphasis added).
162 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
' 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
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the possibility, or should have known, that his information might be the
object of an FOIA request when he supplied it to the government. He
made a "self-governing" choice in supplying it and should not now be heard
to protest the result. Nonetheless, this leaves open the questions of
whether the information was supplied in a fully voluntary manner, and
of the effect of the first amendment on the release of information about
a subject when the information was not supplied by the subject. An ex-
ample of this would be the position of Doe's chairman. At the very least,
first amendment interests are implicated by the release of information
by the government.
The fourth amendment offers protection against government actions
which invade reasonable expectations of privacy. This "reasonableness"
cannot be based on subjective expectations. If it was, as has been often
pointed out, the government could make all searches and seizures
"reasonable" simply by making frequent announcements that, in the future,
it would routinely carry out extensive spying operations against anyone
suspected of anything. It is absurd to suppose that Mr. Katz, with a shrewd
suspicion that his phone booth might be bugged, should have fewer rights
than Mr. Katz without such a suspicion.
Thus, "reasonable expectations of privacy" means expectations of
privacy which are accepted by society as ones a member ought to have.
In this sense, the expectations an individual has that the government will
not broadcast the information it has about him is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, entitled to fourth amendment protection.
It is unnecessary to show here that there is a pure first or fourth amend-
ment right of action to enjoin the release of private information. All
Chrysler demands is the possibility that the proposed information release
be wrongful, not that its release, but for FOIA, would create a private
right of action. This possibility of wrongdoing is supplied by the poten-
tial for invasion of the right of informational privacy protected by both
amendments in the service of the basic right of self-governance.
The first and fourth amendments overlap in the area of informational
privacy. At the root of them both is the notion of a right to be let alone.
This right to be let alone is seriously devalued by the possibility FOIA
presents of everyone knowing everything about everyone else. If there
is no right of action requiring the demands of privacy to be balanced
against the urgent requirements of public monitoring of the government,
all must live with the constant and inhibiting awareness of the possibility
of our most intimate secrets becoming widely known. It is against having
to live with such an awareness that the privacy guarantees implicit in
the first and fourth amendments must be employed.
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